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Abstract 
The paper sets out to analyze the allocations of financial resources accruing to the European 
regions from the Regional, Rural Development and Agricultural policies of the European 
Union in order to assess their territorial coordination and synergies and their degree of 
compatibility with the "general" objective of territorial cohesion. Regression analysis is used 
to evaluate the relationship between allocated funds (dependent variable) and factors of 
territorial disadvantage (explanatory variables) covering the 20-year period 1994-2013 and 
approximately 90% of total Community expenditure. The analysis reveals that both 
coordination and compatibility with territorial cohesion of the various areas of Community 
policy have not always improved in response to major policy reforms. The territorial 
‘vocation’ of overall Community spending is weakly linked to its distribution among 
different policies, but it crucially depends upon how each policy area defines appropriate 
allocation mechanisms and interventions, based upon the characteristics of each region and 
its ‘local’ needs. 
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In tandem for cohesion? Synergies and 
conflicts between regional and agricultural 
policies of the European Union  
 
1. Introduction 
An equitable territorial distribution of the benefits of the integration process is 
a founding principle of all European Union (EU) policies (article 175 of the 
European Union Treaty). As such, it has been strongly emphasised in recent 
strategic programming documents. However, the objective of social and 
territorial cohesion within the Union cannot be wholly entrusted to cohesion 
policies in isolation (EESC 2007). In the current debate on the future 
composition of the EU budget and its policies, there is a consensus on the 
need to harmonise all the different Community policies and ensure their 
compatibility with the objective of territorial cohesion. This consensus is by 
now part and parcel of the Union's overall growth and development strategy 
"Europe 2020" (European Commission 2010a) and an essential component of 
its guidelines for reforming the single policies in line with this strategy: 5th 
Cohesion Report (European Commission 2010) and Barca Report (Barca 2009) 
for regional policies; The CAP Towards 20201 for agricultural and rural 
development policies. 
However, notwithstanding the explicit request by the EU policymakers for 
instruments able to perform a territorial-level assessment of the interrelations 
                                                        
1 In this document the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is given the objective to deliver ‘a 
territorially and environmentally balanced EU agriculture within an open economic environment’ 
(European Commission 2010b, p.4) 
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between policies of different nature and their correlation with territorial 
cohesion, a significant gap still exists in this area of academic literature.  
Although some contributions (either academic or more policy oriented in 
character) have tried to evaluate the impact of the EU's regional and 
agricultural policies on cohesion processes, their attention has alternated 
between one or the other policy area, overlooking their interactions (synergic 
or conflicting) and joint impact at the territorial level. This separation can be 
explained by the different disciplinary approaches of the scholars concerned 
(mainly agricultural economists for agricultural policies and regional 
economists/economic geographers for regional policies, Kilkenny 2010) as 
well as by the division of responsibilities within Community bodies (DG 
AGRI and DG REGIO respectively) and the ministries of the single member 
states. As a result existing literature offers few analytical insights for 
understanding the relationships between policies and the possibilities of 
influencing territorial cohesion by modifying the territorial allocation and 
composition of overall Community spending in favour of instruments with a 
more markedly territorial vocation.  
This work is an attempt to respond to the foregoing request and contribute 
towards the present debate on the future of Community policies after 2013, by 
undertaking a comprehensive systematic analysis of the EU's regional, 
agricultural and rural development policies, accounting, as they do, for 
almost 90% of total Community spending. The analysis is concentrated upon 
the result of the resource allocation process at the territorial level and looks at 
its spatial structure (territorial allocation). The objective is to explore the 
synergies between the different policy areas, in terms of the composition of 
expenditure and territorial coordination, and its coherence with the 
geography of structural disadvantage factors, upon whose elimination the 
capacity of any policy to promote territorial cohesion is premised.  
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2. ‘Sectoral’ and ‘place-based’ policies and territorial 
cohesion 
While some policies may be considered "space neutral"  in terms of both their 
intent and outcomes– for example competition policies – others, albeit 
spatially neutral in their intent – as in the case of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) – exhibit a considerable spatial impact (Duhr et al. 2010). 
However, a rigid separation between sectoral and place-based approaches has 
long dominated the EU policies (and their analysis). This conceptual 
separation has lead different strands of literature to shed light on different 
aspects of the evolution of agricultural, rural development and regional 
policies of the European Union with limited systemic perspective. 
Only a few ‘territorial’ analyses of the EU agricultural policy have highlighted 
its potentially distortive impact on cohesion. The RICAP study (European 
Commission, 1981) examined the impact of CAP resources on the European 
NUTS1 regions in the preceding 20 year period and warned of a trend 
towards the polarisation of agricultural incomes generated by CAP spending, 
forewarning against its potentially perverse impact in terms of "distributive 
equity". It is precisely the lack of equity within the sector and across territories 
that was identified as one of the principal "failures" of the CAP intervention 
model (Barbero et al. 1984; European Commission, 1985). However, the 
impact of successive changes in the organisation and financial structure of the 
CAP on the real territorial distribution of resources is not altogether clear. 
Tarditi and Zanias (2001) highlighted a recurrent problem of equitable 
distribution as between the beneficiaries of the policy which remained 
unchanged within the EU15 until 2006 (Velazquez, 2008). The ESPON study 
(2004), by using much more detailed spatial data than previous studies, 
revealed the anti-cohesion impact of CAP spending, which was only 
potentially mitigated by the then fledgling rural development measures 
A tandem for cohesion? 
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(Shucksmith et al. 2005). The analyses by Bivand and Brundstad (2003) 
continued in the same direction and using more sophisticated spatial 
econometric techniques highlighted the negative impact of CAP payments on 
the economic convergence processes taking place between the EU regions in 
the 1990s. Esposti (2007) with reference to the same time period also 
underlined how the enormous volume of CAP spending had no positive 
effect upon regional growth, although not constituting a "counter-treatment" 
with respect to regional policies. Furthermore, with reference to the CAP 
trend foreseen after 2013, existing analyses concur in emphasising the risk of a 
fundamental conflict between the effects of agricultural intervention and the 
objectives of the cohesion policy (Bureau and Mahè, 2008, p. 5; Esposti 2008).  
The growing awareness of first-pillar CAP’s potentially perverse 
redistributive effects supported the idea that this distortion originates in the 
‘disembedding of agriculture from the regional and local context’ (Gallent et 
al. 2008, p. 108), which accentuates the concentration of the policy's benefits 
upon a few major producers situated in more economically dynamic rural 
areas. The vitality of rural areas cannot be determined exclusively by the 
modernisation of their agricultural structures while the growing 
diversification of economic activities calls for a response able to satisfy their 
needs with an increasingly territorial (Saraceno, 2002) and "place-based" 
approach. This awareness has also been enhanced with the recognition by the 
parts involved in the political debate of a need for greater integration between 
the various areas of Community policy (European Commission 1988). The 
1996 Cork European Conference on rural development Rural Europe – Future 
Perspectives inaugurated a more systematic approach to agricultural policies 
by increasing the emphasis on rural development tools and trying to 
rationalise and reorganise all the instruments within a single ‘second-pillar’ 
CAP container. Unfortunately, the mere juxtaposition of a set of highly 
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heterogeneous measures under the same label was the result of a political 
compromise, which put a new emphasis on the territorial approach, but 
implicitly accepted the predominance of sectoral measures within the 
framework of the EU rural development policy (De Filippis and Storti 2002). 
Not surprisingly, the evolution of this ‘hybrid’ policy from a sectoral towards 
a ‘place-based’ approach has been highly non-linear. While in Agenda 2000 
(European Commission 1997), at least in Objective 1 regions, structural funds 
and rural development measures formed part of the same regional-level 
programming procedure, for the 2007-2013 financial period these 
interrelations have been cancelled, bringing rural development policies back 
within the framework of the CAP: ‘the most widespread concern is with the 
separation of the Rural Development component of the Agriculture-Rural 
Fund (EARDF) from the whole of cohesion policy’ (Barca 2009, p.162).  
Having ascertained both the potentially anti-cohesion effects of CAP 
expenditure and the difficulty of transforming CAP funds from ‘sectoral’ 
intervensions into more ‘territorial’ tools, the debate remains concentrated on 
the existence of real advantages - from the cohesion standpoint - of shifting 
resources towards measures that have an explicit place-based nature. The EU 
regional policy is genuinely "spatial" in both its intention and outcome insofar 
as characterised by a place-based approach. However, its real contribution 
towards the cohesion process – i.e. an effective capacity to address the factors 
of regional disadvantage – can certainly not be taken for granted in the light 
of the significant distortions that characterise its institutional development 
and implementation (Armstrong 2001; Armstrong and Taylor 2000). As 
concerns the impact of the EU's regional policy on the objective of economic 
and territorial cohesion, the empirical evidence is somewhat contradictory 
(Batchler and Wren 2006; Martin and Tyler 2006; Wren 2005). Most of these 
studies, whether neoclassical in their approach (Boldrin and Canova 2001) or 
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inspired by the perspective of the "New Growth Theory" (Magrini 1999), or 
adopting the standpoint of the New Economic Geography (Martin 1999; Puga 
2002), highlight the limited impact of the EU regional policies on the 
convergence process, and stress the fundamental distortion of market 
equilibria. Some more recent contributions, which adopt theoretical 
approaches capable of evaluating policies in terms of the interaction with a 
potentially much wider range of factors, while agreeing upon the limited 
nature of the policy’s impact upon the degree of convergence, have proposed 
a more varied set of explanations for their findings: the distortions produced 
by Structural Funds on the localisation choices made by companies with the 
highest innovative potential (Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman 2002); the 
importance of the receptive capacity of beneficiary regions (Cappellen et al. 
2003; Ederveen et al. 2006) and countries (Beugelsdijk and Eijiffinger 2005); 
the role of lagged effects over time (Esposti and Bussoletti 2008) or the 
imbalanced distribution of funds across axes of intervention (Rodriguez-Pose 
and Fratesi 2004). Mohl and Hagen (2010) reviewed at least 15 other 
quantitative studies, which with similar approaches to those discussed above 
reached altogether conflicting conclusions on the impact of cohesion policies. 
In light of all this, the impact on territorial cohesion of changes in the 
composition of overall Community spending from sectoral interventions in 
favour of place-based policies  - not only through an increase in the overall 
budget quota reserved to cohesion policies in but also through the 
incorporation in the same framework of other types of intervention such as 
Rural Development interventions - cannot be taken for granted. The existing 
literature on all these policy areas clearly demonstrates that their 
compatibility with territorial cohesion should be the subject of careful 
empirical evaluation overcoming the existing separation between sectoral and 
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place-based approaches if we are to shed some new light on the key issues 
raised by the ongoing policy debate 
 
3. In tandem for cohesion? The empirical analysis of a 
complex relationship 
The analytical separation between sectoral and place-based policies has made it 
difficult to undertake systemic comprehensive analyses of regional and 
agricultural policies, thus preventing not only the quantification of "non-
coordination costs" (Robert et al. 2001) but also the assessment of the real 
progress made towards coordination and impact on territorial cohesion as a 
result of changes in the allocation mechanisms and in the composition of 
Community spending (Batchtler and Polverari 2007). 
First of all, existing studies – with differing methodologies – address the 
problem of evaluating the territorial impact of regional and agricultural 
policies by trying to identify an appropriate counterfactual ("What would 
have happened had the policy never been implemented?"). This problem 
becomes extremely important whenever a simultaneous and comparative 
evaluation is attempted of the contribution made to the regional growth 
processes by policies extremely differentiated in terms of their nature and 
intrinsic objectives (such as the regional and agricultural policies). It is 
difficult to quantify the effects of very different policies that can manifest 
themselves in many different forms and through various mechanisms that 
imply not only different timescales before any effects become apparent, but 
also possible and differential "collateral effects". Furthermore, ex post impact 
analysis can only take place after a considerable lapse of time from the 
conclusion of the programming cycle. More recent studies refer to 
expenditure prior to 2000, thereby preventing policymakers from drawing 
A tandem for cohesion? 
 
 
8 
any "lessons" for the future - even provisional - from the experience of the two 
programming  periods that followed on the heels of important reforms.  
In order to overcome these difficulties, our analysis concentrates upon the 
spatial structure of the funds for Regional, Rural Development and 
Agricultural Policies in order to evaluate potential synergies and conflicts 
before their attendant measures are implemented. In other words, we are 
proposing an analysis of the a priori structure of policies rather than an 
attempt at evaluating their ex-post impact. Therefore, the analysis is 
concerned with the outcome of the resource allocation process at the 
territorial level so as to evaluate both the spatial structure and its coherence 
with the geography of factors of structural disadvantage, upon whose 
elimination the capacity of any policy to promote territorial cohesion 
depends. 
In order to evaluate the a priori compatibility of Community fund allocation 
with territorial cohesion objectives, it is necessary – as asserted by the 
European Commission itself on the occasion of the successive reforms of 
regional policies – to analyse its degree of territorial concentration, i.e. the 
capacity to keep the effects of the policies within the areas subject to 
intervention by ring-fencing spillovers, as far as possible, within the 
disadvantaged areas (Dall’Erba 2005) and, therefore, maximising the potential 
impacts of the policies themselves (Bondonio and Greenbaum 2006). In point 
of fact such "external" effects represent an important component of the policy. 
"The benefits of the Structural Funds when viewed in isolation are modest, 
thus suggesting that the real long-term benefits depend upon the manner in 
which the disadvantaged economies react to the opportunities offered by the 
rest of the EU" (Dall’Erba 2005 p.197). 
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In the second place, the degree of compatibility of the three areas of 
Community policy with respect to the cohesion objectives can be evaluated in 
terms of the association between the actual allocation of financial resources 
and the regions' factors of structural disadvantage (Crescenzi 2009): this 
association is "the measure" of a policy's capacity to allocate its resources 
where a concentration of disadvantage prevents regions from expressing their 
potential (Mairate 2006).  
As a consequence, in the analysis of the regional allocation of Community 
funds for Regional Policies, and Rural Development and agricultural policies, 
we will look at: 
a) the potential inconsistencies/conflicts in the allocation of funds as between the 
various policies (composition of expenditure and territorial coordination); 
b) the coherence between the various policies and the principle of territorial 
concentration  (the spatial structure of spending); 
c) the (potential) capacity of the policies to further the cohesion process through 
their association with factors of structural disadvantage (coherence with 
territorial cohesion). 
The analysis of the spatial structure will be performed through the calculation 
of an autocorrelation index (Moran’s I) (Cliff and Ord 1981). Moran’s I is 
calculated using the formula: 
∑
∑∑
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Where: 
 y is the per-capita spending at the regional level for the various policies: 
Regional, Rural Development and first-pillar CAP;  
A tandem for cohesion? 
 
 
10 
wij is a sequence of  normalised weights that relates the observation (region) i 
to all the other observations (regions) j in the dataset.  In the empirical 
analysis conducted in this article, the element wij of the weight matrix is:  
∑
=
j ij
ij
ij
d
d
w 1
1
               (2) 
where dij is the linear distance between region i and region j. 
If the I index values are greater (lower) than the expected value E(I) = -1/(n-1) 
this will denote a positive (negative) autocorrelation. 
To answer questions a) and c) the following regression model for panel data is 
specified: 
tititititi PXy ,,
'
1,
'
,
εγβτµα +++++=
−
     (3) 
where: 
y is again the per-capita spending at the regional level for the various policies:  
Regional, Rural Development and first-pillar CAP; 
X   is the index of structural disadvantage of the regions calculated with the 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA); 
P  is the per-capita spending in  OTHER areas of Community policy other 
than y 
µ   are fixed individual effects: the non-observable features of regions that 
impact upon the allocation of funds but which remain invariant over time;  
τ  is the temporal trend  
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ε   is idiosyncratic error 
and with  i representing the region, t the programming  period (1994-99, 2000-
06, 2007-13) and t-1 (for the Index of Structural Disadvantage) the year preceding 
each programming period (i.e. 1993, 1999 and 2006 respectively). 
The estimate of parameter β therefore, indicates the funds' capacity to target the 
most disadvantaged regions of the European Union thereby promoting 
economic convergence. A significant and positive value of parameter β would 
denote a systematic association between the structural disadvantage of the 
European regions and the "intensity" of the support provided by the various 
policies. This association offers a measure of the compatibility of policies – 
regardless of their different specific functions – with the more general 
objective of territorial cohesion. Vice-versa, the lack of significance for this 
coefficient would suggest a substantially "neutral" distribution of Community 
resources from the territorial viewpoint and hence its potential conflict with 
the cohesion objectives announced by Community policy makers. 
The estimate of parameter γ on the other hand, is a measure of the trade-offs or 
synergies operating between different policy areas. A significantly negative 
value for this parameter would suggest that a "compensatory" mechanism is 
at work among the policies thus maintaining a substantial equilibrium as 
between the transfers received from the various regions of the Union. On the 
contrary, a positive value for the parameter would suggest that the funds of 
different policies tend to target the same areas with a "cumulative" and/or 
"knock-on” process among the policies. In addition, the estimation of an 
interaction term between structural disadvantage and the funds allocated for 
the various policies will make it possible to evaluate if this cumulative effect 
coincides with the most disadvantaged areas (suggesting the presence of "pro-
cohesion" synergies) or if it is linked to the capacity of the regions to attract 
A tandem for cohesion? 
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funds from different policies by virtue of characteristics other than their being 
disadvantaged. 
The structural disadvantage index of the regions ( X ) is defined on the basis of 
those structural characteristics of regional economies that the economic 
literature as a whole associates (either singularly or in various combinations) 
with a reduced or non-existent capacity to converge upon levels of growth 
and development that characterise the "heart" of the EU (Boschma 2004; Budd 
and Hirmis 2004; Cheshire and Magrini 2000;  Huggins 2009a; Pike et al. 2006; 
Rodriguez-Pose 1998a and b). Such features refer to three principal 
dimensions: the accumulation of human capital (Lundvall 1992; Malecki 1997; 
Crescenzi 2005; Huggins 2009), the productive use of such capital in terms of 
the demand for and supply of specific sectoral skills (Gordon, 2001) and the 
overall endowment of basic infrastructures (Chancre e Thompson 2000; 
Crescenzi and Rodriguez-Pose 2008), which makes the circulation and 
productive utilisation of regional resources possible. Each of these possible 
sources of structural disadvantage finds justification in different strands of the 
literature on the economic performance of the regions. Thus while the 
neoclassical approach has given greatest emphasis to the role played by 
physical capital endowments (public and private) in improving the 
productivity of a local factors, the latest theories linked to "endogenous 
growth" draw attention to the importance of human capital and its 
"qualitative" composition (in terms of skill composition) in line with – and 
especially as regards the latter feature – the literature on the operation of 
global markets at local levels and upon the determinants of the spatial 
concentration of unemployment. However, some recent contributions  - by 
integrating various theoretical approaches - have shown how the 
simultaneous presence of all these factors of "socio-economic disadvantage" 
constitutes a permanent obstacle to the long-term development of the 
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European regions (as also those of the United States) (Rodriguez-Pose and 
Crescenzi 2008; Crescenzi et al 2007; Kitson et al. 2004). As a consequence, the 
effectiveness of regional development policies can be assessed in terms of 
their capacity to "target" in an "equilibrated" fashion all these factors 
simultaneously. For this reason the capacity of all EU policies to re-distribute 
Community financial resources, in a manner more or less compatible with the 
general objective of territorial cohesion, has been empirically tested by 
evaluating the relationship between structural disadvantage – i.e. the 
simultaneous presence of factors of disadvantage in all the dimensions 
discussed earlier – and the funds earmarked to each region. The distributive 
mechanisms of a policy are, therefore, deemed "virtuous" from the point of 
view of territorial cohesion whenever they manage to channel a greater 
volume of resources towards the most deserving areas in structural terms, i.e. 
those where structural disadvantage is highest. This is an a priori criterion, 
which applies independently of the evaluation of the impact of the single 
policies. Different policies propose different objectives and, therefore, impact 
on different factors (ranging from farm income support  for the first pillar 
CAP to the formation of human capital for some regional development 
programmes). However, the overall geography of the distribution of 
Community resources has a consistent impact on the most general processes 
of territorial cohesion through synergies or conflicts that arise between 
various policy areas. Therefore, an assessment of the capacity of Community 
redistributive mechanisms to channel resources towards structural 
disadvantage is an a priori measure of their general compatibility with the 
requirement of territorial cohesion.  
The concept of structural disadvantage as applied to the European regions is 
operationalised by identifying suitable proxies for each of the foregoing three 
"dimensions": the "Percentage of the Population with a Tertiary Educational 
A tandem for cohesion? 
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Attainment" and the "Percentage of the Economically Active Population with 
a Tertiary Educational Attainment " are chosen as proxies for the 
accumulation of human capital, the " Long-Term Unemployed as a Percentage 
of All Unemployed" and "the Percentage of the Economically Active Persons 
in Agriculture" (Federico 2005) are chosen as the proxy for the productive use 
of human capital and "Kilometres of Motorway per 1000 Inhabitants" is the 
proxy for basic infrastructural assets. The choice of these simple indicators is 
dictated by the limited availability of homogeneous statistical data for all the 
European regions commencing from 1993, i.e. the year prior to the first 
programming period considered in this analysis. The information contained 
in the variables chosen is synthesised as a single indicator by means of 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) (Duntenam 1989; Joliffe 1986) whose 
results, set out in Tables A-1 and A-2 in Appendix A, generate the ‘Structural 
Disadvantage Index’ used in the following analysis. The first principal 
component accounts for around 50% of the total variance of the original 
indicators (as shown by the eigenanalysis of the correlation matrix in Table A-
2) and its scores  are computed from the standardised value of the original 
variables by using the coefficients listed under ‘Component 1’ in Table A-1. 
These coefficients assign a large positive weight to educational achievement 
and infrastructure endowment; these are major components of the socio-
economic tissue of the regions. A negative weight is assigned, instead, to the 
long term component of unemployment and to the percentage of agricultural 
labour. The first Principal Component (‘Component 1’) scores constitute the 
‘Structural Disadvantage Index’ introduced into the regression analysis as an 
aggregate proxy for the structural disadvantage of each region. In order to 
minimize the potential endogeneity between allocated financial resources and 
regional disadvantage and, at the same time, account for the conditions 
observed by the policy-makers when allocating the funds, the index is 
Crescenzi, De Filippis and Pierangeli 
 
15   
calculated for each year t-1 preceding each programming period holding 
constant the PCA coefficients (computed on the longitudinal dataset2).  
 
3.1 A joint territorial databank for Community spending from 1994 to 2013 
The analysis carried out in this article is based upon an innovative databank 
containing information on the first and second pillar of the CAP and the 
Structural Funds of regional policy in the last three programming periods 
(1994-1999, 2000-2006 and 2007-2013) that referred to the member states of the 
EU15. 
The data are aggregated at the level of the relevant administrative authorities 
in the framework of the policies considered. Obviously, the administrative 
level of interest will vary from one Member State to another according to how 
the responsibilities for agriculture, rural development and regional policies 
are distributed. Therefore, while in general terms the information gathered 
contributes towards the establishment of a homogenously regionalised 
databank, data are organised with reference to different territorial levels 
(NUTS levels)3 in different member states. 
The information gathered constitutes the sum of the resources directly funded 
by the European Union, as illustrated in the table in Appendix C. 
Consequently, financial resources deriving from national co-financing do not 
form part of the databank used for the analysis. There are two reasons for this: 
first, the analysis sets out to establish an a priori geographical allocation of 
                                                        
2 The stationarity of the variables was preliminarily tested: The tests confirmed the stationarity 
of the series, allowing us to implement the PCA analysis on the panel dataset.    
3 Regions in Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom are classed at NUTS1 level while 
Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg have no sub-national divisions: for the remaining EU15 
member states expenditure has been classified at the NUTS2 level.  
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resources rather than their territorial impact; second, as we wish to draw 
attention to the structures of the negotiated policies at a Community level, co-
financing would modify the relations between the first-pillar of CAP, which 
does not envisage a national contribution, and the second pillar of CAP and 
the Structural Funds. 
As concerns the first pillar of the CAP, existing literature has encountered 
considerable difficulty in obtaining consolidated data at regional level for 
relatively long time intervals. Some criticism has also been made in recent 
years on account of the fragmentation and quality of available expenditure 
data, notwithstanding the “European Transparency Initiative” (Reg. (EC) n° 
1290/2005) that requires Member States to annually publish the beneficiaries 
of appropriations made from the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund 
(EAGF) and the European Agricultural Rural Development Fund (EARDF). 
To overcome these limitations, first-pillar CAP data have been processed in 
an innovative manner based on the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN), 
while the financial appropriations, actually allocated to each territorial unit, 
have been utilised for rural development and regional policy (See annex B for 
a detailed discussion of the procedures followed). 
In the framework of rural development, as noted earlier, interventions were 
financed not only by the EAGGF Guarantee section but also by the EAGGF 
Guidance section up until the last programming period when the resources 
were merged into a single fund (EAFRD). As regards both the 1994-1999 
programming period and Agenda 2000, the data referring to rural 
development policy come from two sources: DG REGIO, for data on EAGGF 
Guidance; DG AGRI4, for data on EAGGF-Guarantee. In the 2007-2013 
                                                        
4 The data derive from the PSRs of the EU15 
(http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rur/countries/index_en.htm). 
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programming period, the EAFRD data derived from the single programming 
instruments of the EU15 member states5. 
Structural Fund data were derived from an ad hoc dataset provided by the 
Directorate General for Regional Policy of the European Commission (DG 
REGIO) in May 2009.  
Altogether the databank comprises about 3000 observations that specify the 
estimate of actual expenditure (for the first-pillar) and the funds allocated (for 
the Structural Funds and rural development) in the three programming 
periods considered with regard to the regions of the EU 15 Member States.  
EUROSTAT was the source of the data on the structural characteristics of the 
regions that we used for the computation of the Structural Disadvantage 
Index.  
Countries without a relevant regional articulation (Denmark, Ireland and 
Luxemburg) were necessarily excluded from the analysis. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Composition of expenditure and territorial coordination 
The analysis of the correlation between regional allocations for the same 
policy in successive programming periods and between different policies in 
the same time period sheds light on the equilibrium between persistence and 
compensation in the relations between the various areas of Community 
policy. Table 1 sets out a preliminary analysis of the simple correlations (and 
their statistical significance) between per capita expenditure at a regional level 
and, respectively, the regional policies, rural development and first-pillar 
                                                        
5 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rur/countries/index_en.htm 
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CAP in the three programming periods considered (1994-1999; 2000-2006; 
2007-2013).  
If we observe the correlation between expenditure allocations for the same 
policy in successive programming periods we can evaluate the level of 
persistence over time of the policy itself in the distribution of its resources at a 
territorial level. The analysis of persistence in regional expenditure allocations 
enables us to make a first evaluation of the territorial impact of the reforms 
that succeeded one another over time in the various Community policy 
frameworks. Both regional policies and first-pillar CAP exhibit a high level of 
persistence in the regional allocation of funds between programming periods: 
for regional policies a 97% correlation was found between 94-99 and 2000-
2006, and a 92.5% correlation between the 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 
programming  periods; as regards the regional distribution of first-pillar CAP 
expenditure the correlation was respectively 94% and 93 %, a sign of the 
ongoing link between the “new” CAP, based on decoupled direct payments, 
and the "old" one, based on market policy. As regards rural development,  
relationship showed a relatively higher level of dynamism over time, as 
indicated by the correlations between successive periods of, respectively, 64% 
between 94-99 and 2000-2006; and 80% between 2000-2006 and 2007-2013, due 
to the significant growth and modification that this policy underwent in the 
last twenty years, together with the ambiguity of its reform process. For these 
reasons, the foregoing compromise (more money to territorial intervention in 
rural areas, but under the control of the agricultural lobbies and institutions) 
decided with Agenda 2000 was crucial: on one hand, it had the merit of 
introducing a more organic rural development policy, giving it more financial 
resources, but on the other it was responsible for its "dilution" in a big 
container of different measures, the second Pillar of the CAP, which as a 
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component of agricultural policy is dominated by a sectoral (more than 
territorial ) approach.  
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Table 1 - Correlation Analysis: Per Capita Expenditure for Regional Policy, Rural Development and PAC 1st Pillar 
 
Regional Policy 
94-99 
Regional 
Policy 00-06 
Regional 
Policy 07-13 
Rural 
Development 
94-99 
Rural 
Development 
00-06 
Rural 
Development 
07-13 
PAC 1st 
Pillar 94-99 
PAC 1st 
Pillar 00-06 
PAC 1st 
Pillar 07-13 
Regional Policy 94-99 (Per 
Capita Expenditure) 
1         
Regional Policy 00-06 (Per 
Capita Expenditure) 
0.9680* 1        
  
(0.000)         
Regional Policy 07-13 (Per 
Capita Expenditure) 
0.8961* 0.9250* 1       
  
(0.000) (0.000)        
Rural Development 94-99 
(Per Capita Expenditure) 
0.8090* 0.7884* 0.7464* 1      
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
Rural Development 00-06 
(Per Capita Expenditure) 
0.5553* 0.5946* 0.5645* 0.6377* 1     
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
Rural Development 07-13 
(Per Capita Expenditure) 
0.4498* 0.4909* 0.4982* 0.5626* 0.7998* 1    
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
PAC 1st Pillar 94-99 (Total 
Regional Payment pc) 0.4126* 0.4475* 0.4156* 0.4755* 0.3699* 0.3390* 1   
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
PAC 1st Pillar 00-06 (Total 
Regional Payment pc) 
0.3897* 0.4315* 0.4110* 0.4760* 0.4545* 0.4961* 0.9374* 1  
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
PAC 1st Pillar 07-13 (Total 
Regional Payment pc) 0.3869* 0.4126* 0.3800* 0.4687* 0.4152* 0.4155* 0.8498* 0.9347* 1 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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By referring once again to Table 1 we can evaluate the level of correlation 
between the various policy areas in the same programming period as well as 
its evolution over time so as to evaluate the degree of 
complementarity/substitutability between different EU policies. In this 
context a significant reduction in the correlation of regional level spending 
between regional policies and rural development is immediately evident: 
from 80% in the period 94-99, it falls to 59% in the period 2000-06 and to 50% 
in the period 2007-13, thus suggesting that these two policy areas have been 
progressively moving apart. As just mentioned, the origin of this process can 
be found in the political compromise decided with Agenda 2000, and, which, 
moreover, has been reinforced during the present programming period, with 
the abandonment of the integrated programming approach, decoupling rural 
development policy form regional policies and allocating it in the same 
agricultural fund also for the intervention in the objective 1 regions. 
The association between other policy areas is inferior in relative terms but 
substantially stable over time.  
 
4.2 Territorial concentration and the spatial structure of expenditure  
In order to throw light on the relationship between policies and their potential 
compatibility with the objective of territorial cohesion, it is necessary to study 
the spatial distribution of their financial resources and their capacity for 
geographical concentration in line with the structural disadvantage of 
regions. 
Table 2 illustrates the Moran’s I Indices calculated on the basis of Equation 1 
discussed earlier for each policy and programming period and for the 
Structural Disadvantage Index of the regions. The lack of spatial 
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autocorrelation in the allocation of funds – with an I index close to the 
expected value, E(I), indicated in the table – would seem to point to an 
indiscriminate distribution of funds. On the contrary, a positive Moran I 
index that is significantly different from E(I) denotes the presence of a 
positive spatial autocorrelation: high spending areas are associated with a 
"neighbourhood" of areas with relatively high spending levels, in line with the 
principle of the "geographical concentration" of spending for the purpose of 
maximising its effectiveness in territorial terms. 
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Table 2 – Territorial concentration of expenditure for Regional, Rural Development and PAC ‘first pillar’ (Measures of 
global spatial autocorrelation) 
Variables I E(I) sd(I) z p-value*     
Regional Policy 94-99  0.244 -0.007 0.042 5.973 0.000     
Regional Policy 00-06  0.25 -0.007 0.042 6.14 0.000     
Regional Policy 07-13  0.258 -0.007 0.042 6.305 0.000     
     
 
    
Rural Development 94-99  0.13 -0.007 0.042 3.254 0.001     
Rural Development 00-06  0.11 -0.007 0.04 2.932 0.002     
Rural Development 07-13  0.201 -0.007 0.042 5.01 0.000     
     
 
    
PAC 1st Pillar 94-99  0.116 -0.007 0.042 2.922 0.002     
PAC 1st Pillar 00-06 0.12 -0.007 0.042 3.03 0.001     
PAC 1st Pillar 07-13 0.105 -0.007 0.042 2.676 0.004     
     
 
    
Structural Disadvantage Index (PCA) 0.339 -0.007 0.042 8.209 0.000     
*1-tail test          
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The Moran I index for Regional Policy points to there being a clear 
concentration of Community spending that tends to increase, albeit 
marginally, in response to successive reforms and to a progressive 
reinforcement of the criterion of the territorial concentration of spending. 
Rural Development Policies, although exhibiting a level of territorial 
concentration considerably lower than that of the regional policies, reveal a 
significant increase in their capacity to "focus" financial resources upon 
specific areas of intervention in the last programming period (Greenbaum and 
Bondonio 2004). In other words, despite the progressive "decoupling" from 
regional policies discussed earlier, the mechanisms to select the beneficiaries 
of the rural development policy for the 2007-2013 programming period seem 
able to guarantee a higher level of territorial focus. On the other hand, the 
geography of first-pillar CAP spending – in line with the sectoral and non-
territorial nature of this policy – exhibits a much lower degree of territorial 
concentration (and statistically less significant) with respect to rural 
development. Furthermore, this differential tends to widen in the period 
2007-2013. 
In order to evaluate whether or not the degree of territorial concentration 
reached by the policies is suitable for tackling the persistent structural 
disadvantage of the economic "periphery" of the EU, it is necessary to 
compare the degree of spatial autocorrelation with that of the Structural 
Disadvantage Index. Structural disadvantage (Table 2) exhibits much more 
spatial concentration than Community funds, which should, instead, be 
contributing towards attenuating this disadvantage, thereby suggesting the 
need to move towards a further increase in the territorial concentration of 
interventions (Crescenzi 2009). 
Altogether these results suggest that shifting resources from first-pillar CAP 
to Rural Development interventions can increase the coherence of overall 
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Community spending in terms of the territorial concentration criterion, and 
potentially that the degree of coherence can move closer towards the degree 
of structural disadvantage of the regions. However, if the CAP is to contribute 
towards the achievement of the EU's long-term objectives, it does appear 
necessary to make an improvement in the distributive criteria also for the 
first-pillar, taking greater account of the economic and territorial 
disadvantages that characterise the context in which agricultural activity is 
performed.  
 
4.3 The association between funds received and structural disadvantage 
The estimate of the regression model specified in Equation 3 offers a 
systematic analysis of the territorial structure of the Community funds and of 
their capacity to develop reciprocal synergies and target the more 
disadvantaged areas.  
Table 3 sets out the results of the cross-section estimate of the empirical 
analysis model that was estimated separately for each Community policy and 
each programming period. The per capita spending at regional level for each 
Community policy is, therefore, regressed onto the Structural Disadvantage 
Index discussed above and onto a set of "national" dummies whose purpose is 
to isolate any national "fixed effect": the systematic capacity of regions 
belonging to the same country to receive more (or less) funds regardless of 
their degree of disadvantage with respect to other areas of the Union.  
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Table 3 – Structural Disadvantage and the Regional Distribution of EU funds: Cross Section Analysis with country dummies 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Regional Policy  
Regional 
Policy  
Regional 
Policy  
Rural 
Development 
Rural 
Develop
ment 
Rural 
Development 
PAC 1st 
Pillar 1 
PAC 1st 
Pillar 1 
PAC 1st 
Pillar 1 
  1994-99 2000-06 2007-13 1994-99 2000-06 2007-13 1994-99 2000-06 2007-13 
Structural Disadvantage Index (PCA) 54.05** 85.97*** 80.38*** 17.27*** 35.89* 21.02* 189.3*** 263.7*** 224.0*** 
 (20.82) (28.58) (23.87) (6.038) (18.34) (11.13) (44.94) (63.44) (67.28) 
SE 28.97 21.67 85.08 7.375 114.0*** 173.6*** -193.8 139.4 132.7 
 (33.09) (88.38) (68.78) (10.66) (22.32) (11.21) (148.8) (145.7) (150.4) 
DE 242.3*** 273.1* 219.0** 59.75* 91.04* 89.73** -228.5 -157.5 -61.47 
 (91.83) (145.8) (106.5) (32.60) (46.15) (35.91) (153.1) (166.9) (189.6) 
IT 131.6 71.79 51.63 34.07 25.39 89.90 -650.0*** -708.8** -543.4* 
 (88.24) (147.1) (113.1) (30.67) (77.78) (54.96) (220.7) (276.7) (298.7) 
FR 40.13 -72.09 -107.4* -0.0428 -3.962 31.67 304.2 450.9* 544.8** 
 (50.94) (97.10) (61.45) (15.31) (40.70) (24.87) (208.7) (236.7) (250.0) 
AT -27.67 -78.80 -139.9* -9.364 323.4*** 420.3*** -466.7*** -116.7 -302.3 
 (70.94) (123.9) (83.59) (17.34) (45.77) (26.96) (168.0) (190.3) (205.8) 
BE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
PT 1,095*** 1,402*** 1,310*** 125.6*** 206.5** 227.0*** -587.4** -642.8* -521.2 
 (99.77) (184.6) (195.3) (29.75) (85.07) (49.44) (259.3) (335.9) (343.2) 
NL 20.15 -93.19 -154.4*** -10.51 -48.99* -30.30* -129.2 -317.6* -249.6 
 (50.57) (96.87) (53.73) (12.98) (29.25) (18.24) (154.1) (162.7) (172.3) 
UK 83.71 -14.93 24.00 -10.92 -39.82 24.46 -325.6** -294.1* -161.0 
 (59.20) (90.97) (84.98) (12.94) (27.58) (21.95) (152.7) (159.4) (174.7) 
ES 615.0*** 677.9*** 430.2*** 84.62*** 187.1** 156.3*** -32.19 367.6 617.5** 
 (86.93) (134.7) (102.1) (19.48) (71.97) (45.40) (211.0) (278.0) (305.9) 
GR 1,193*** 1,754*** 1,109*** 150.1*** 241.2*** 237.4*** 419.9 393.3 421.0 
 (112.3) (177.7) (115.0) (28.72) (80.30) (49.07) (270.0) (331.8) (402.7) 
FI 29.19 175.4 142.1 33.78* 197.1 511.2*** 735.7*** 1,914*** 1,619*** 
 (54.28) (138.1) (100.2) (20.01) (191.5) (169.5) (168.6) (339.8) (331.9) 
Constant 129.9** 338.7*** 326.9*** 40.06*** 111.9*** 78.88*** 925.5*** 1,103*** 946.5*** 
 (50.88) (97.31) (61.41) (15.06) (40.76) (25.15) (157.9) (172.3) (191.7) 
Observations 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 
R-squared 0.811 0.827 0.787 0.502 0.421 0.604 0.537 0.539 0.465 
Robust standard errors in parentheses          
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1          
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The results concerning Regional Policies (Table 3, columns 1-3) highlight a 
positive and statistically significant link between structural disadvantage and 
funds received by the regions. A higher degree of structural disadvantage is 
associated with a higher level of spending on regional policies regardless of 
the country to which the region belongs. The association between 
disadvantage and Community spending increased from 2000 as shown by an 
increase in the significance of the coefficient.  
The analysis of the coefficients associated with national dummy variables 
(lower part of the table, indicated by the corresponding country codes) 
provides confirmation of the model’s explanatory power. The regions of post-
unification Germany (DE) received (in the period 94-99, column 1) 
systematically higher levels of financing with respect to the other regions, in 
addition to what would have been "justified" by their degree of structural 
disadvantage. However, this effect (shown by the magnitude and significance 
of the ‘DE’ dummy variable coefficient) tends to disappear in the successive 
programming periods (columns 2 and 3). On the contrary, the "premium" for 
the regions of the cohesion countries, Portugal (PT), Spain (ES) and Greece 
(GR), is systematic and persistent – positive and statistically significant in all 
programming periods (columns 1, 2 and 3). This premium is provided in 
addition to the Cohesion Fund reserved for cohesion countries and Ireland, 
and from which the latter withdrew in January 20046. The data provide no 
confirmation, instead, of the hypothesis that a redistribution mechanism 
operates between various policy contexts so as to systematically favour the 
                                                        
6 The Cohesion Fund has not been included in the databank as its resources are allocated at the 
national level. 
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United Kingdom as "compensation" for the limited benefits obtained from the 
first pillar of the CAP7. 
As regards Rural Development Policies (Table 3, columns 4-6) the association 
between funds and structural disadvantage appears to be considerably 
weaker than that of the regional policies, and above all is found to wane over 
time commencing from the 2000-2006 programming period. This weakness 
also seems to underline the predominance of the sectoral function in the 
criteria used for distributing resources within the framework of rural 
development. Therefore, the progressive "decoupling" between the regional 
policies and rural development interventions, as observed in the preceding 
paragraph, is accompanied by a reduction in the association between the two 
policies and the structural disadvantage of the regions probably due to the 
abandonment of the integrated programming among the various funds. If we 
consider the distribution of the "national premiums" implicit in the regional 
allocation of funds for Rural Development (again by looking at the National 
Dummy variables in the lower part of the table) we find, in this case too, a 
mechanism for the assignment of premiums to cohesion countries (significant 
and positive national dummies in all programming periods) that, 
furthermore, was later extended – commencing from the period 2000-2006 – 
to some economically strong countries such as Sweden, Finland and Austria; 
which may, in part, be explained by their possessing a high proportion of 
agricultural land classified as Less Favoured Areas (IEEP, 2006)8. 
As concerns the first-pillar of the CAP (Table 3, columns 7-9) the association 
with disadvantage remains positive and significant, in line with the findings 
of Tarditi and Zanias (2001). However, the total variability in the regional 
                                                        
7 The imbalance in the UK’s contribution position led to the Fontainbleau Agreement (1984) and 
the determination of a permanent rebate of its contribution towards the Community budget (De 
Filippis, Sardone, 2010). 
8
 This is especially true for Austria and Finland, which in 2005 accounted for 72% and 100% 
respectively of SAU (IEEP, 2006). 
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allocation of funds as explained by the model (as indicated by the R-square) is 
relatively limited and decreases over time. And, as the following table clearly 
illustrates, this relationship disappears altogether when additional controls 
for the characteristics of the regions are introduced into the model. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to ascertain that as regards the first-pillar – in line 
with our expectations – no "premium" mechanism is detectable in favour of 
countries on the EU's periphery, even if the initial penalisation of Portugal 
(found for the period 94-99, negative coefficient for the Dummy Variable PT 
in column 7) seems to have been corrected in successive periods (in columns 8 
and 9 the coefficient loses its significance). In addition, even the penalisation 
to which the Italian (IT) and British (UK) regions were subject (again negative 
sign of the corresponding dummy variable) also seems to have disappeared in 
the more recent programming periods (columns 8 and 9) although in these 
same periods the "premium" for the French (FR) regions was reinforced (the 
‘France’ national dummy variable becomes positive and significant in 
successive programming periods, columns 8 and 9). 
Table 4 sets out the results of the estimation of the model of empirical analysis 
as specified in Equation 3, estimated with two-way fixed-effects panel 
methodology9. 
The availability of regionalised expenditure data for the three consecutive 
programming periods enables us to make simultaneous use of both the cross-
                                                        
9
 The choice of a Fixed  Effects approach is justified on both conceptual and empirical grounds. From 
the conceptual point of view, the regions included in the dataset cannot be considered as a ‘Random 
Sample’ of the EU regions. In addition the individual components cannot be considered as uncorrelated 
with the explanatory variables as assumed in a Random Effects approach. From the empirical 
standpoint, the Hausman test confirms that Fixed Effects estimation has to be preferred over Random 
Effects. The F-test for the joint significance of individual effects also confirms the high significance of 
the regional fixed effects. 
In our dataset the cross-sectional dimension is significantly larger than the time dimension (the 
explanatory variables cover the 1993-2006 period). In this context, the low time-series variability of the 
dataset a priori prevents non-stationarity from affecting our estimates through spurious correlation. The 
hypothesis of stationarity is confirmed by three different unit root tests for panel data (the Im-Pesaran-
Shin, the augmented Dickey-Fuller and the Phillips-Perron tests) which, as expected, reject the 
hypothesis of non-stationarity at conventional significance levels. 
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section and time-series variability of the data through the methodologies of 
panel data analysis. The estimation of the empirical analysis model in its fixed 
effects panel data specifications makes it possible to evaluate the relationship 
between structural disadvantage and Community funds after controlling for 
all the region-specific characteristics that are non-observable/non-measurable 
and invariant over time (fixed effects) and for all factors common to all 
regions and subject to development over time (temporal dummies). This 
specification, therefore, allows us to evaluate the capacity of the various 
policies to target their funds upon structural disadvantage by removing from 
this relationship not only the effects of belonging to a certain country (as in 
the cross-section analysis discussed earlier) but also – for example – those of 
geographical position, historical factors, institutional quality (i.e. the general 
capacity of local institutions to "attract" EU resources over and above their 
structural disadvantage), sectoral macro-structure, firm-size structure etc.. 
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Table 4 - Structural Disadvantage and the Regional Distribution of EU funds: Panel Data Analysis (Fixed Effect Two-Way), Regional 
Policy, Rural Development Policy, PAC 1st Pillar 1994-2013  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Regional Policy  
Regiona
l Policy  
Regiona
l Policy  
Rural 
Developme
nt 
Rural 
Developme
nt 
Rural 
Developme
nt 
Rural 
Developme
nt 
Rural 
Developme
nt 
PAC 1st 
Pillar 1 
  
1994-
2013 
1994-
2013 
1994-
2013 1994-2013 1994-2013 1994-2014 1994-2013 1994-2014 
1994-
2013 
Structural Disadvantage Index 
(PCA) Panel 44.27 47.71* 30.17 27.40* 32.06** 44.55*** 24.81* 26.92* -54.84 
 (27.45) (26.06) (30.00) (14.33) (13.79) (14.25) (13.51) (14.26) (50.63) 
PAC 1st Pillar  0.0627 0.0630  0.0849*** 0.0847*** 0.0753** 0.0749**  
  (0.0565) (0.0578)  (0.0326) (0.0318) (0.0309) (0.0304)  
Regional Policy        0.152*** 0.157***  
       (0.0241) (0.0290)  
Interaction Term 
Disadvantage*PAC 1st Pillar   0.0153   -0.0109    
   (0.0185)   (0.00865)    
Interaction Term 
Disadvantage*Regional Policy        -0.00472  
        
(0.0101)  
TD00 96.02*** 89.25*** 89.14*** -19.89 -29.06** -28.98** -42.62*** -42.39*** 108.0** 
 (27.00) (25.89) (26.03) (13.89) (13.72) (13.81) (12.82) (12.80) (43.17) 
TD94 
-
169.6*** 
-
159.3*** 
-
155.6*** -159.7*** -145.7*** -148.4*** -121.5*** -121.1*** -164.2*** 
 (34.05) (36.18) (36.57) (20.26) (20.09) (20.09) (21.26) (21.39) (60.91) 
Constant 557.1*** 493.7*** 486.6*** 222.3*** 136.6*** 141.7*** 61.53 61.01 1,010*** 
 (20.38) (64.10) (66.82) (10.04) (34.12) (32.82) (40.02) (40.33) (38.53) 
          
Observations 417 417 417 417 417 417 417 417 417 
R-squared 0.291 0.297 0.299 0.325 0.354 0.358 0.403 0.404 0.277 
Number of id 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses          
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1          
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Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 reveal a weak relationship between structural 
disadvantage and funds for Regional Policies after controlling for the time-
invariant characteristics of the regions. A low correlation between funds and 
structural disadvantage that varies over time denotes a limited capacity on 
the part of regional policies to target the more structurally backward areas by 
tackling the factors of disadvantage that can develop over time. If we observe 
the relationship between various policy areas (column 2) it does not appear 
that any "compensatory" mechanism exists at a regional level between 
regional policies and the first pillar of the CAP: receiving an amount of funds 
that is higher (lower) with respect to the average in terms of first-pillar CAP 
funds is not compensated by a larger (smaller) appropriation in terms of 
Structural Funds, as indicated by the non-significant coefficient. The 
relationship between the two policy areas is found to be non-systematic even 
when it is attempted to relate potential compensation synergies/mechanisms 
to structural disadvantage by introducing an interaction term between the 
two variables (column 3). 
The analysis of the structure of rural development policies – which as 
suggested by the foregoing analysis have undergone very significant 
developments in recent years, in terms of their financing and territorial 
structure – reveals a good capacity to target financial resources upon the most 
disadvantaged areas (column 4). The somewhat "hybrid" nature of the Rural 
Development Policies, which is the result of a place-based transformation of 
the "old" sectoral policies, clearly emerges when we consider the “knock-on 
effect” of the rural development funds with regard to both first-pillar CAP 
funds (column 5) and regional policy funds (column 7). After controlling for 
conditions of structural disadvantage, the areas that obtain more funds for 
rural development policies are those that have received a relatively higher 
amount of funds for the other two areas of Community policy, which denotes 
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a carry-over effect not found in the regional policies. Is this a virtuous process 
for concentrating the resources of different policies in disadvantaged areas? 
Unfortunately, the interaction term between spending on "other" policies and 
the index of structural disadvantage indicates that synergies of this type are 
absent: as concerns both first pillar CAP spending (column 6) and regional 
policies (column 8), the concentration of funds in the same areas does not 
coincide with the most disadvantaged areas. 
The rural development policies, therefore, seem to be significantly influenced 
by the other policy areas with respect to which they absorb resources and 
‘borrow’ intervention models, but this influence does not translate itself into 
synergetic financial allocations in favour of the more disadvantaged areas. 
Conversely, the reduction in the relative weight (in terms of the Community 
budget) of first pillar CAP spending would seem to favour an increase in the 
overall relationship between spending and structural disadvantage (thus 
making the EU budget altogether more "pro cohesion”): first pillar CAP 
spending is quite unrelated to the disadvantage of beneficiary areas (column 
9). However, a regional allocation of funds that is the most compatible with 
the territorial cohesion objectives is not an "automatic" consequence of the 
shifting of resources from one policy area to another. 
A systematic reading of the results suggests that the reinforcement of rural 
development policies can potentially promote compatibility between the 
allocation of total EU resources and cohesion. Yet the development of 
synergies in disadvantaged areas is still very limited as this is crucially 
conditioned by the need for a more pronounced "territorial vocation" of these 
policies, as also for a stronger integration and coordination with other policies 
“on the ground”. In the same way, the capacity of regional policies to target 
resources upon the weaker areas has still to be improved and such a capacity 
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is certainly very much influenced by changes in the mechanisms of policy 
regulation. 
 
5. Conclusions  
The relations between the various EU policy areas and their degree of 
compatibility with the objective of EU territorial cohesion is constantly 
evolving and is still far from being "consolidated". The ongoing policy debate 
on the future of the EU policies exhibits a growing emphasis upon 
coordination between policies and their compatibility with the cohesive 
territorial development of the European Union. However, the analysis of the 
impact that successive "adjustments" to the Community budget and the macro 
processes of reform have had upon the spatial structure of expenditure 
demonstrate that if, on the one hand, various policy areas show significant 
interrelations, on the other, the synergies between policies remain relatively 
limited and also reveal a trend that is not always in line with the "declared" 
objectives of the reforms undertaken.  
Nevertheless, the results produced in this paper do provide material for 
timely ‘policy-learning’, thus making it possible to clearly identify the 
weaknesses of the various policies with respect to coordination and territorial 
cohesion, and offering useful suggestions for the current debate on the 
composition of the Community budget in the post-2013 period.  
Changes in the composition of the EU budget in terms of the relative ‘weight’ 
of different policies will certainly open new ‘windows of opportunity’ for 
territorial cohesion. At a first glance, decreasing financial emphasis on CAP 
expenditure should make it possible to reinforce both Rural Development 
policies and Regional Policies, and allow coordination and territorial cohesion 
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to benefit from their ‘place-based’ approach. However our results have also 
made potential threats apparent.  
First of all, our results highlight the need to increase coordination between the 
various contexts of Community policy by – for example – bringing (back) 
Rural Development Policies and Regional Policies within a Common Strategic 
Framework. Yet it is also clear that neither coordination with regional policies 
nor the shifting of resources from one policy area to another are "virtuous" in 
themselves as regards territorial cohesion. All areas of Community policy – 
including regional policies – have their light and dark sides in terms of how 
they target resources on structural disadvantage: the capacity to make a 
positive contribution to territorial cohesion crucially depends upon the 
policies actually implemented “on the ground” within the single policy areas 
and upon the respective allocation mechanisms. 
Second, the impact of a reinforcement of Rural Development Policies and 
Regional Policies on territorial cohesion, is largely dependent upon the 
capacity of these policies not to "lose territorial focus" over time (Greenbaum 
and Bondonio 2004), thereby frustrating the benefits of a place-based 
approach and resurrecting the equitable distribution problem associated with 
the "old sectoral paradigm”. Rural development policies should learn from 
the experience of regional policies but without replicating their defects. In this 
regard,our results suggest that incorporating rural development policies 
within the complex framework of cohesion policies – along the lines of the 
Barca Report proposal – would not by itself constitute a guarantee that these 
interventions would be more “cohesion orientated” . Even for regional 
policies, there is still significant room for improvement in the funds' allocation 
mechanisms from the point of view of increasing their spatial concentration 
and focus on disadvantage. The progressive increase in the resources 
earmarked to this area of Community policy has produced only limited 
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benefits in terms of spending structure and seems to have led to a partial 
"dilution" in the interventions over time. 
Third, the results of the analysis on the territorial structure of fund allocation 
suggest to balance the opposing views emerging in current debate on the 
future of the EU Regional Policy. Some economists suggest that ‘some 
reallocation of the funds across target regions would lead to higher aggregate 
growth in the EU and could generate faster convergence than current scheme 
does’ (Becker et al. 2010, p.1). Conversely, the Barca Report (2009) adopts a 
more ‘conservative view on territorial allocation’ (p.p.113 and 158) on the 
basis of the lack of valid alternatives and the high political ‘costs’ of 
negotiations on these issues. Our analysis has highlighted the possibility of 
improving the geographic concentration of financial resources in all spheres 
of Community policy but it also suggested that this objective should be 
pursued by means of a careful evaluation of the specific needs of each area 
(also in terms of thematic priorities). For this purpose a set of robust 
indicators of economic and social disadvantage can certainly support a more 
transparent redistribution of financial resources. However, more effective 
targeting of financial resources towards structural disadvantage also requires 
the mobilization of national and local actors that the ‘strategic development 
contracts’ between each Member State/Region and the Commission  proposed 
by the Barca Report can certainly facilitate. 
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Appendix 
APPENDIX A –Structural Disadvantage Index for the EU Regions: Principal 
Components Analysis (PCA) 
 
Table A-1 – Index of Structural Disadvantage: Principal Components Analysis,  Scoring 
coefficients  
    sum of squares(column-loading) = 1     
Variable 
Component 
1 
Component 
2 
Component 
3 
Component 
4 
Component 
5 
Agricultural Labour 
Force -0.4357 -0.1607 0.5541 0.6907 -0.0137 
Long Term Component 
of Unemployment 
-0.1988 0.6518 0.5816 -0.439 0.0674 
Education Population 0.5864 -0.1657 0.3517 0.0632 0.7078 
Education Employed 
People 0.582 -0.0958 0.3971 0.0123 -0.703 
Kms of motorways per 
thousand inhabitants  0.2967 0.716 -0.2706 0.571 0.0052 
      
      
Table A-2 – Index of Structural Disadvantage: Principal Components Analysis,  Principal 
components/correlation 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative  
Component 1 2.424 1.29763 0.4848 0.4848  
Component 2 1.12637 0.102927 0.2253 0.7101  
Component 3 1.02344 0.611799 0.2047 0.9148  
Component 4 0.411645 0.397104 0.0823 0.9971  
Component 5 0.0145409 . 0.0029 1  
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APPENDIX B – Methodology for the computation of Common Agricultural 
Policy- First Pillar expenditure at the Regional Level  
 
The following Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) PUBLIC DATABASE 
indicators were used for the computation of CAP-First Pillar Payments: Total 
Subsidies on Crops10 (SE610), Total Subsidies on Livestock11 (SE615) and Decoupled 
Payments12 (SE630). Conversely, “Environmental Subsidies” (SE621) as per art.  69 
Reg. (CE) n. 1782/2003 were not included in the computation of total regional 
expenditure. 
The following steps were followed for the computation of ‘Total Regional 
Expenditure for first-pillar CAP: 
1) The above-mentioned annual subsidies (Euro/Farm) were added up for each 
region and multiplied by the number of farms located in each region (total 
regional subsidies) and each member state (total national subsidies); 
2)  Total national subsidies calculated on the basis of FADN data were 
compared with actual payments as reported in the Yearly Financial Reports 
of EAGGF – Guarantee / EAGF (European Commission, 1994-2009); 
3) In order to account for non-commercial farms not covered by the FADN 
database, the difference between actual and estimated national payments was 
subdivided across regions in proportion to their share of non-FADN farms 
(i.e. Number of Non-FADN Farms in Region i / Total Number of Non-FADN 
Farms in Country j) calculated from EUROSTAT data for each region; 
                                                        
10 Including:-Amounts paid to producers of cereals, oilseeds and protein crops (COP crops) and 
energy crops payments. -Amount of premiums received by COP producers obliged to set aside 
part of their land. Such land may, however, be used for certain non-food crops -All other farm 
subsidies on field, horticultural and permanent crops. 
11 Including: Any subsidies on dairy products, All farm subsidies received for cattle other than 
dairy cows in production, Any subsidies on sheep/goat milk products, All other farm subsidies on 
other livestock or livestock products. 
12 Including: Single Farm payment, Single Area payment, Amount resulting from the application of 
modulation to the first EUR 5000 or less of direct payments 
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4) Total regional subsidies were calculated as the sum of ‘Total regional 
subsidies for FADN-Farms’ (Step 1) and ‘Total regional subsidies for Non-
FADN-Farms’ (Step 3).  
5) Total payments in each Programming Period (to match Structural Funds and 
Rural Development expenditure) computed reiteration of Steps from 1 to 4 
for each individual year. 
In order to conduct a robustness check, Total Regional Payments estimated with this 
procedure were compared with a sample of actual payments at the regional level 
available from the Italian National Paying Agency. The Pearson Correlation between 
regional level payments is very high (0.98)13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
13 The detailed table available upon request 
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Appendix C – Databank structure by programming period, policy area and source of funding 
 
Programmes 1994-1999 Programmes 2000-2006 Programmes 2007-2013 
A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
a
l
 
p
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
 
CAP - first 
pillar EAGGF - Guarantee 
CAP - first 
pillar EAGGF - Guarantee CAP - first pillar EAGF 
R
u
r
a
l
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
 
EAGGF - Guarantee 
(Accomp. measures )* 
 EAGGF - Guarantee 
 
 
EAFRD 
Ob. 1 
EAGGF - Guidance 
 
EAGGF - Guidance 
Ob. 5A Ob. 1 
Ob. 5B Leader + 
Ob. 6 
 
Leader II 
C
o
h
e
s
i
o
n
 
P
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
 
Ob. 1 ERDF     ESF        FIFG 
Ob. 1 ERDF     ESF        FIFG Convergence ERDF 
Ob. 6 ERDF      ESF       FIFG 
ESF 
Ob. 2 ERDF ESF 
 Ob. 2 ERDF ESF Regional 
Competitiveness 
and Employment 
ERDF 
ESF 
Ob. 5B ERDF ESF 
Ob. 3 ESF 
 Ob. 3 ESF  
Ob. 4 ESF 
13 Comm. 
Initiatives several funds 
4 Comm. 
Initiatives several funds 
Territorial 
Cooperation ERDF 
*Information on accompanying measures for the period 1994-1999 (EAGGF-guarantee) are not currently available. 
EAGF: European Agricultural Guarantee Fund 
EAFRD: European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
ERDF: European Regional Development Fund 
ESF: European Social Fund 
FIFG: Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance  -    The databank has no information on the Cohesion Fund 
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